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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents an analysis of the variation of the effect of the Danish industrial relations-
system (IR-system) on wage formation across 26 industries covering both the private and the public 
sector. It is of societal relevance to explore the changes with regard to wage distribution and 
inequality that could be expected from changes in the IR-system as a consequence of union decline 
and state reforms provoked by the international economic crises. 
 In the late-2000s, Denmark as a total had the lowest level of inequality measured by the Gini-
coefficient among the OECD countries. For the working age population the coefficient was even 
lower.1 This tendency towards equality is also expressed by the fact that Denmark is the country 
with third lowest earning premium from education measured by relative earnings from employment 
by level of educational attainment (OECD 2011:138). This suggests that the Danish labor market is 
structured in a way which has the consequence that the returns received through wage by the 
individual from investment in human capital such as education, special training etc., are relatively 
small. 
 In general the low level of inequality can be explained by the extensive redistributive welfare state 
system (Abrahamson, P. 2010; Esping-Andersen, G. 1990). However, when we consider the low 
inequality in wage distribution we must consider the role played by the labor market institutions, 
because changes in the wage income distribution contribute greatly to the variation of the Gini-
coeffient (Danish Economic Council 2011:201 et seq.). As often remarked by students of industrial 
relations, the Danish labor market is characterized by a high level of institutionalization with strong 
trade unions and employers’ organizations. Wages and other labor market arrangements are as a 
rule regulated by collective agreements negotiated by trade unions and employers autonomously of 
state power. This arrangement is often termed ‘the Danish model’ (Jensen, C. S. 2012). 
 Hence, there is reason to assume that the low level of inequality cannot be explained solely by the 
redistributive role played by the state, and that the Danish industrial relations system influences the 
wage distribution independently of state power. Furthermore, the OECD data referenced above 
suggest that the labor market is modified by the Danish industrial relations system in a way that 
                                                          
1 Source: The OECD database, http://stats.oecd.org/. Data extracted the 25th of June, 2012. 
 
IREC 2012/ESA RN 17 SEGMENTATION AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN DENMARK 
JONAS TOUBØL and CARSTEN STRØBY JENSEN  2 
 
furthers equality and reduces the earning premiums from human capital such as education. How 
more exactly the IR system influences the wage formation and in turn how these effects varies 
across industries and sectors are the object of analysis in the following. 
 In this article we will try to estimate the impact of the institutional structures on wage formation 
process in Denmark focusing especially on how trade union membership influence wage formation 
at the Danish labour market. We will present an empirical analysis of wage differences in Denmark 
and use different types of theories to explain these differences. The data used for the analysis is 
register data including in principle all employees on the Danish labour market. The data has been 
collected by the national Danish statistical bureau (Statistics Denmark) and has been delivered to us 
by Center for Survey and Survey/Register Data (CSSR). 
 In the following section, we will present some general theories about wage formation focusing on 
Human Capital theory and on more institutional oriented theories. Secondly, we will make a short 
presentation of the Danish system of Industrial Relations in order to develop our arguments about 
how the institutions on the labour market influence wage formation and income distribution in 
Denmark. Thirdly, we present data and the empirical analysis including results and subsequent 
discussion. Finally, we conclude on the findings and discussion. 
2. THEORIES ABOUT WAGE FORMATION 
We will focus on two major positions within wage formation theory and use them as a theoretical 
framework in the upcoming analysis. Firstly we will briefly present Human Capital theory. Secondly 
we will present what could be called institutional wage formation theory. 
 Human Capital theory states that we can explain differences in wages with reference to labour’s 
differences in qualifications. It is mainly the level of human capital (education, qualification) related 
to the single employee that explains differences in wages. The argument is that education is to be 
looked upon as an investment. The single worker considers whether it is attractive or non-attractive 
to take an education and relates his or her consideration to the level of return for e.g. each year of 
further education. It is expected that education will contribute to the marginal productivity of the 
single worker (otherwise employers will not give higher wages to employees with higher education). 
 Human Capital theory argues within a rational choice theoretical framework and fundamentally 
assumes that the market is transparent and the individual are behaving rational in the instrumental, 
egocentric and utility-maximizing sense. 
 When Human Capital theory is operationalized in relation to more empirical analysis of wage 
formation, variables as educational background, seniority, age and the like is often used in the 
analysis. 
 Institutional theory often stresses that wage formation and wage distribution is influenced by 
other factors than ‘the market’. Different types of ‘non market’ institutions matters: “Labor 
economists who study wage distribution from a comparative perspective typically end up arguing 
that institutions matter, that is, that supply and demand factors alone cannot explain observed 
variations in wage inequality across countries.” (Pontusson 2000: 293).  
Institutions can be looked upon as a framework that frame the choices made by employers and 
employees on the labour market. Supply and demand is contextualized by different types of 
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institutions in a way that makes the market ‘biased’ for certain types of preferences. Gender relation 
can be looked upon as a social institution that frames the labour market and influence the wage 
formation (and wage differentiation) among men and women. 
 In this context our interest is mostly oriented toward discussing how industrial relations systems 
(IR-systems) – as an institutional framework for the labour market - tend to influence wage 
formation (and in the longer perspective wage inequality). Especially our focus is upon the trade 
unions and how trade union membership influence wage formation. 
 A number of different observations have been made in relation to the discussion about how 
systems of industrial relations influence wage formation. IR-systems can be looked upon as an 
institutional structure that in some respect decommodify the relations between employees and 
employers (Hyman, R. 2001; Hyman, R. 2001). Collective bargaining and collective agreements are 
institutions that structure the process of wage bargaining and influence the mechanisms of the 
market to a degree that in some instances perhaps even mute the impact of market forces on wage 
distribution as Rueda & Pontusson (2000) suggests backed by empirical findings. Economic theory 
will look upon these institutions as ‘market failures’ while industrial relations theory and 
institutional theory will stress that ‘institutions matters’. 
 Trade unions have a special interest in influencing the bargaining process and if possible intend to 
demand wages above the normal market level. As stressed by Blanchflower and Bryson: “A primary 
goal of trade unions is to maintain and improve workers’ terms and conditions, particularly workers 
who are members of the union, through collective bargaining with employers.  Whether unions are 
successful depends, in large part, on their bargaining strength which is based on their ability to 
restrict the supply of labour to the employer and on the ability of employers to concede above-
market wages (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Blanchflower et al. 1990; Blanchflower and Bryson 
2010). 
 Similar it is argued in the literature that trade unions will try to reduce the wage differentiation 
among employees. Freeman argue for example “…that unions ‘approximate the logic of democratic 
decision making (one person one vote) more than markets do, and whenever the mean exceeds the 
median wage, we would expect a majority of union members to favor redistributive wage 
demands.” (quoted from Pontusson 2000: 306). Strong trade unions will – all other things being 
equal – increase the likelihood of seeing in a comparative perspective low levels wage and income 
differentiation (Rueda & Pontusson 2000).  
 In the following sections we will try to estimate the effects of factors that the two types of 
theoretical positions emphasizes as important when we shall understand wage formation, in order 
to analyse the variation in wage formation across industries. Before presenting this empirical 
analysis we shall consider what effects we should expect from institutional and human capital 
factors on the Danish labour market. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON WAGE FORMATION IN DENMARK 
In this section we make a short presentation of some of the major institutional characteristics 
regarding the Danish IR-system. We especially focus on the characteristics that could be expected 
to influence the wage formation process. Finally we will shortly discuss how these institutional 
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arrangements in combination with the institutional effects if the Danish educational system might 
influence the level of inequality. The fact that education to a great extend is free in Denmark could 
be expected to influence the ‘return of investment’ expectations among the employees on the 
Danish labour market. 
 Trade unions and employers’ associations play a major role on the Danish labour market. 67 % of 
the labour force was organized in trade unions in 2007 (see table 1), while around 55 % of the 
employees work in companies organized in an employers’ association (Jensen, C. S. 2012). Wages 
are determined either by individual negotiation between the employer and employee, or by 
collective bargaining between trade unions and employers associations or companies. The total 
collective bargaining coverage was in 2007 around 80 % and for the public and private sector the 
number was 100 % and 71 % respectively (Due et al. 2010:81). In Denmark there is neither 
legislation about wages, nor on minimum wages and wage formation is therefore mainly regulated 
by the market forces and collective agreements negotiated by employers and trade unions 
(Beskæftigelsesministeriet 2009:2). The state’s absence in this process adds to the importance of the 
role played by the labour market institutions. 
 The explanation of the ‘trade union wage-premium’ (that is, ‘how much do workers gain by being 
member of a trade union compared to those who are not a member’) can be identified at three 
distinct levels: 1) at the industry or sector level, 2) at the company level, 3) and at the individual 
level. The effects at levels one and two can be considered collective, as they stem from collective 
agreements between trade unions on one side, representing the collective body of labour, and 
employers on the other. The effect at the third level is individual and due to some individual 
advantage provided by the membership of a trade union, e.g. support from union experts when the 
individual employee negotiate with his or her employer. 
 The effects at the collective levels can be conceptualized as collective goods, that is, goods that all 
has access to benefit from no matter whether they contribute to the production of the goods 
(Olson 1971). In this case, contributions to the production of collective agreements are made 
through membership of a trade union. Whether the collective good, the collective agreement 
improving wages for all employed in the company, is produced then depends on the union density: 
the higher the share of union members the higher the likelihood of a collective agreement because 
the union’s bargaining power is increased. 
 The union density necessary for a collective agreement to be produced can be conceptualized as 
the critical mass. In this case the critical mass is the number of union members at the workplace or 
in the industry necessary for the union to be able to force an agreement on the employer(s) (Oliver 
et al. 1985; Marwell et al. 1988; Oliver & Marwell 1988). However, a share of unionized employees 
that exceed the point of critical mass will maximize the benefit from the collective good, as the 
bargaining power is further increased and the unions will be able to obtain a better result. For these 
reasons we expect that the higher the union density at the workplace or industry level, the stronger 
the collective effects on wage formation. 
In industries or sectors with a collective bargaining coverage near one 100 % (due to e.g. different 
types of extension mechanisms, like the erga omnes principle in France (Commission of the 
European Community 2008) or an institutional setup where collective agreements are made at a 
centralized level), we should expect to see none or little variation in effects at the company and 
individual level. Every employee would be expected to have their wages set independently of their 
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individual trade union membership because everybody would be covered by the same collective 
agreement. This could however be moderated if a given collective agreement contains a high level 
of room for local negotiation and wage formation, e.g. if the general collective agreement stipulate 
decentralized collective bargaining. In that situation trade union members could be expected to 
have an advantage at local level compared to their unorganized colleagues. Thus, even if we should 
expect no variation in the collective effect at the industrial level due to 100 % coverage, like for 
instance the public sector in Denmark, we might see variation in the effect at the company and 
individual levels. Lastly, we could expect that different product market situations in different 
industries would influence how much trade unions will be able to influence wage formation. 
Different conjectural and cyclical situations would influence trade unions ability to influence wages 
(Bratsberg & Ragan Jr. 2002). 
At the individual level positive effects could stem from the access to supplementary training 
because of a discriminatory practice at the workplace putting union members first in line. The 
unions as well urge their members to gain further training and education and thus union members 
might be more proactive in getting access to supplementary training and education than non-
members. Other practices discriminating against non-members might also be part of the 
explanation.  
However, these explanations are contested. As argued by Booth and Bryan it is hard to explain 
why a rational non-member wouldn’t join the union in order to avoid discrimination (Booth and 
Bryan 2004:404 et seq.). Studies of the English labour market has shown, that when the 
information about coverage by collective agreements are included in the analysis, it is hard to detect 
much effect from individual membership (Booth and Bryan 2004; Koevoets 2005). However, in 
Denmark, union representatives often have a say in distribution of task, working hours, 
supplementary training and even in the process hiring, due to the extended degree of cooperation 
between unions and employers. Therefore, we should not rule out observed effects at the individual 
level due to union membership per se. 
3.1 THE EFFECT OF THE IR-SYSTEM AND THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ON INEQUALITY 
It is usually assumed that trade unions have an egalitarian or wage compressing effect on wage 
distributions. This assumption is supported by a historical study comparing the development in 
wage distributions before and after the break down of the Swedish central bargaining system in 
1983 (Hibbs Jr. and Locking 2000). This study shows that the effect of trade unions can be wage 
compressing both with regard to within as well as between industry wage distributions. We might 
therefore expect to see variation in the level of compression of the wage distribution between 
industries depending on the wage regulating institutional setup and the strength of the trade unions. 
 However the wage distribution, according to human capital theory should be expected to be 
dependent on the distribution of human capital. Iversen and Stephens (2008) argue that the high 
level of social protection in the Scandinavian Social Democratic welfare states lowers the risk 
connected with engaging in educational programs, hence encouraging investment in education (in 
Denmark access to education is provided for free on all levels from elementrary school to 
university level, and students engaged in state-recognized programs are subsidized by the state). 
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This generates a high general level of human capital, especially at the lower end. The high level and 
compressed distribution of human capital in itself compresses the wage distribution thus furthering 
equality. In addition, it supports the unions’ pursuit of an egalitarian agenda. Hence, the presence of 
strong trade unions might amplify the effect of a compressed human capital distribution (Iversen 
and Stephens 2008). This in part explains the low level of wage-premiums from education observed 
by OECD, but it also points to role played by institutions, especially trade unions, which pursuit 
wage compression.  
 This leads us to expect that wage compression will follow from strong union presence at the 
industry level in itself but also that strong union effects may mean smaller human capital effects on 
wage level, thus decreasing the inequality in wage income, that otherwise would stem from variation 
in labour’s level of human capital. 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE INDUSTRIES 
Data used in this article is collected by Statistics Denmark comprising the entire Danish labour 
market. We use two databases: one containing information about various characteristics on the 
individual level like education, age, income etc., and one with information about various company 
characteristics like surplus, number of employees and so on. The two databases can be merged 
which enables us to combine data on individual and company level covering the total Danish labour 
market. 
 Our overall intention is to identify the effects of on the one side educational experience and on 
the other side union membership (individual and at workplace level), on the hourly wage. With 
reference to the discussion above it would have been interesting to have a variable about collective 
bargaining coverage on company level. Data about collective bargaining coverage is however not 
available. Instead we consider the union density at the workplace level. 
 First we estimate the effect of education and union membership at a national level. We then 
continue to estimate the effects at the industrial level, as the variation of these effects across 
industries are the primary object of the analysis. 
 As can be seen from table 1, which presents the mean income, years of education and union 
density distributed by industry and occupation, trade union membership levels differs from industry 
to industry  implying that we could expect different effects of trade unions on the wage formation 
in different industries. Simultaneously, an analysis at industry level will also make it possible to take 
industry specific market conditions into account. Labour markets and the effects of Human Capital 
input (measured by educational experience) could be expected to vary from industry to industry 
depending on industry composition of labour and on business cycles.  
 In table 1 we can identify quite big differences between industries with regard to the variables we 
are analysing. The mean hourly wage and relative wage distribution, measured as the relative size of 
the standard error to the mean hourly wage in percent, vary strongly from industry to industry. The 
level of average human capital input and trade union density also vary a lot. The variation at the 
industrial level dependent on variable is greater or equal to the variation on the occupational level, 
which underline the relevance of investigating at industrial level. Thus, we have reason to expect 
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variation of the estimated effects of education, individual union membership and level of union 
density between industries. 
TABLE 1.  DESCRIPTION OF CENTRAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS 
INDUSTRY 
_______CASES_______ _____HOURLY EARNINGS (DKK)_____ _YRS. OF EDUCATION_ __UNION DENSITY*___ 
   n Pct. Mean SE Pay-rate var. Mean SE Workplace General 
Agriculture. horticulture. forestry 10,131 0.61% 176.03 58.745 33% 12.16 2.040 52.45% 37.76% 
Fishing 396 0.02% 312.22 156.940 50% 10.80 2.304 56.49% 53.16% 
Mining and quarrying 2,432 0.15% 256.36 77.498 30% 12.29 2.497 80.89% 73.89% 
Mfr. of food. beverages and tobacco 47,573 2.87% 204.07 60.330 30% 11.72 2.408 80.77% 73.81% 
Mfr. of textiles and leather 4,950 0.30% 184.52 54.605 30% 11.73 2.403 71.89% 67.33% 
Mfr. of wood products. printing and publ. 35,213 2.12% 213.99 68.516 32% 12.49 2.372 74.54% 69.27% 
Mfr. of chemicals and plastic products 39,646 2.39% 235.29 79.962 34% 13.27 2.768 73.82% 73.04% 
Mfr. of other non-metallic mineral prod. 11,556 0.70% 213.65 56.217 26% 11.62 2.511 82.24% 80.63% 
Mfr. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 134,495 8.12% 207.81 68.603 33% 12.49 2.415 79.18% 77.71% 
Mfr. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 17,280 1.04% 188.02 63.038 34% 11.86 2.414 76.27% 73.93% 
Electricity. gas and water supply 9,222 0.56% 245.11 74.593 30% 13.43 2.259 82.45% 78.81% 
Construction 120,502 7.27% 196.82 70.377 36% 12.24 2.046 71.49% 70.49% 
Sale and rep. of motor vehicles. sale of fuel 33,620 2.03% 183.14 66.038 36% 12.27 1.869 63.41% 56.04% 
Wholesale except of motor vehicles 96,541 5.83% 221.79 85.222 38% 12.75 2.137 63.15% 59.99% 
Re. trade and repair work exc. of m. vehic. 81,513 4.92% 156.86 56.910 36% 12.12 1.944 49.76% 41.83% 
Hotels and restaurants 20,518 1.24% 165.42 56.021 34% 11.75 2.048 49.53% 34.66% 
Transport 61,393 3.70% 210.52 66.322 32% 11.87 2.312 70.57% 64.60% 
Post and telecommunications 35,589 2.15% 204.85 77.047 38% 12.23 2.308 74.65% 67.38% 
Finance and insurance 66,460 4.01% 252.00 98.021 39% 13.37 1.810 77.38% 75.50% 
Letting and sale of real estate 19,569 1.18% 207.63 84.278 41% 12.67 2.236 64.70% 55.69% 
Business activities 134,540 8.12% 249.36 101.336 41% 13.99 2.541 62.34% 55.31% 
Public administration 101,800 6.14% 210.05 58.676 28% 13.68 2.220 89.07% 88.34% 
Education 152,763 9.22% 209.72 50.450 24% 14.90 2.425 81.88% 80.03% 
Human health activities 120,299 7.26% 204.75 81.953 40% 14.23 2.312 87.81% 86.31% 
Social institutions etc. 229,743 13.86% 165.81 41.556 25% 12.69 2.262 80.85% 79.96% 
Associations. culture and refuse disposal 68,125 4.11% 203.79 72.415 36% 12.81 2.730 73.91% 64.78% 
Unknown economic activity 1,303 0.08% 183.89 80.961 44% 12.99 2.313 69.18% 50.62% 
Elementary occupations 140,708 8.49% 172.66 49.828 29% 10.97 2.388 67.13% 60.73% 
Plant and machine operators. and assemblers 129,895 7.84% 194.36 49.847 26% 11.12 2.337 78.91% 85.46% 
Craft and related trades workers 214,341 12.93% 194.91 63.628 33% 12.40 1.891 72.06% 82.62% 
Skill. agricultural. forestry and fishery workers 9,982 0.60% 177.48 56.907 32% 12.07 1.898 57.24% 58.80% 
Service and sales workers 245,077 14.79% 160.12 47.236 30% 11.77 1.784 65.21% 64.65% 
Clerical support workers 206,742 12.48% 181.72 53.651 30% 12.46 1.778 70.44% 73.98% 
Technicians and associate professionals 420,495 25.37% 218.07 76.029 35% 13.81 1.833 75.28% 79.53% 
Professionals 288,123 17.39% 264.25 88.253 33% 15.74 1.881 75.74% 78.84% 
Managers 1,809 0.11% 287.69 117.749 41% 13.91 2.209 69.15% 67.48% 
Entire labour market 1,657,172 100% 204.11 74.935 37% 13.03 2.479 74.66% 67.99% 
* In the calculations of union density all actively engaged in employment in Denmark during 2007 are included in order to obtain the true level of union density. Thus the base is not 1,657,182 cases but 2,663,058. 
The data loss (see appendix) affects that the level of union density in the sample is higher than in the total population engaged in employment during 2007. Therefore the information about union the level of union 
density would be unrealistically high if only the cases in the sample were included in this calculation. 
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5. OLS ESTIMATION AND VARIABLES 
In the following we will present our statistical model and the included variables in detail. Finally we 
will present the full model with all parameter estimates. 
 The favored standard estimator of union wage effects is ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
(Blanchflower & Bryson 2010:97; Schaarup 2009). Standard as well is to transform income or, as in 
our case, wages by the natural log (ln) in order to compensate for the right tail problem usually 
associated with income distributions. In our estimation of the education and union wage premium 
we follow these prescriptions. The natural log of individual worker i’s average hourly wage in 2007 
(ln Wi) is estimated as, 
(1)                              
where Xi is a vector of worker, job and workplace characteristics and Zi is a scale variable 
measuring the number of years of education prescribed for the highest education obtained with the 
parameter β, which represents the average increase in hourly wage per year of education. Ui is a 
dummy variable indicating union membership and the parameter δ represents the average 
proportional difference in hourly wages due to the individual membership of a trade union. Vi is a 
scale variable measuring the union density at the workplace as the percentage of all who is working 
at the workplace including managers and part-time employees who is member of a union. ϑ 
represents change in hourly wage as union density increases. Finally, εi is the error. 
5.1  THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: HOURLY WAGE 
Wage is measured by the variable hourly wage. This variable is constructed by Statistics Denmark and 
in the following we will clarify the procedure employed by Statics Denmark and briefly consider its 
properties. 
 The variable is equal to the wages from the job position held by the employees in November2 
divided by the number of hours worked during the year in relation to the very same job3. Due to 
sampling methods only 2.7 % of the cases included in the analysis are registered as working par-
time, and one should be careful in drawing conclusions with regard to part time employees from 
the results presented in the following analysis. However, according to Statistics Denmark the 
                                                          
2 November has been chosen as the month of Statistics Denmark’s routinized data collection from businesses. 
3 The information about wages is regarded as highly trustworthy as they stem directly from the employers who by law are obliged to 
report wages paid to their employees to the tax authorities. However, there are some difficulties in assessing the number of hours worked 
during the year with regard to individuals working part time, which shall be explained in detail. There is no source of information about 
the exact number of hours worked by the individuals in their respective job positions. Therefore, the number of hours is estimated from 
the amount paid to a certain labour market pension (ATP). The amount paid depends on the number of hours worked and is not a 
percentage of the wage. Thus, all who work full time (>27 hours per week is the Danish norm) pays the same amount to the pension 
fund. However for part time employees the amount varies categorically which for instance means that the amount paid is the same for all 
employees working between 18 and 27 hours per week. These shortcomings are countered by using data with information about 
unemployment, sickness benefit, other jobs held during the year, detailed knowledge about employment in November and 
unemployment insurance funds. By combining these data sources a reliable estimate of the number of hours worked are produced. To 
maximize the reliability, the insecurity of the estimate of hourly earnings is calculated, and is used to exclude cases in which the insecurity 
regarding the estimated hourly earnings is larger than 50 % following Statistics Denmark recommendation. In practice this means the 
exclusion of 423,395 cases which mainly are employees working part time (<27 hour per week). 
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reliability of the estimated hourly earnings of the remaining cases has been tested by The Bureau of 
the Danish Economic Council, and found to be trustworthy on a general level (Danmarks Statistik 
1991 & Danmarks Statistik 2009). Hence, as we in this paper do not deal with analysis of the hourly 
wage of individual cases, but only means of groups of (full time) employees, the results are to be 
trusted on this account. 
5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: EDUCATION, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNION DENSITY 
Education is a scale variable measuring the number of month that is prescribed the highest education 
obtained by the individual. This means that even though one might have completed the education 
faster or slower than the prescribed number of month, this is not measured by the variable. This is 
an advantage because it is hard to imagine why the market value of a given education should change 
because it was completed faster or slower than prescribed as it does not enhance the ability to fill 
the relevant occupation (See Bauer (2002) for an empirical study supporting this line of reasoning). 
 Individual union membership is a dummy variable measuring whether or not a tax deduction regarding 
union subscription is registered by the tax authorities. Thus, the information stems from the tax 
records and is highly reliable, as it is the trade unions who report this information to the tax 
authorities on behalf of their members.  
 Union density is a scale variable ranging from 0 to 100 % measuring the share of individuals 
working at the workplace who are members of a trade union. This percentage is calculated from the 
total population and not only from the cases included in the analyses, because the data loss causes a 
much higher union density in cases included in the regression analyses than among all engaged in 
active employment during 2007 (see appendix). Hence, if union density at the workplace was 
calculated only among the included cases the percentage would be unrealistically high. 
5.3. CONTROL VARIABLES 
The control variables are chosen because there is reason to believe that the socioeconomic events 
and statuses they represent could influence the hourly wage. In the selection of relevant variables 
we are inspired by which have been included in resent studies of wage formation in Denmark 
(Albæk & Thomsen 2011; Larsen 2010). In addition we have tested whether they had any 
significant bearing on the predictions of the model on a national level and only included those 
which had. 
 First control variable is Work experience, which is a scale variable, derived from the amount paid 
into the compulsory labour market pension (ATP). As explained with regard to the dependent 
variable, the amount to pay is estimated from the time worked and the payment administered by 
the employer this is a quite reliable source of information. 
 Occupation is a 9 dummy variable following the major categories of the ILO ISCO-classification 
minus the military which is excluded from the analyses. 
 Gender is a dummy variable with male as reference and female as decisive.  
 Sector is a dummy variable with private as reference and public as decisive. Information stems 
from the authorities registration of whether a company belongs to the private or public sector. 
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 Civil status is a dummy variable telling whether the case is living as single or in some form of 
relationship or marriage. 
 Residency is a dummy variable telling whether the employee lives in the Copenhagen area or 
somewhere in the rest of Denmark. 
 Resident children is a dummy variable telling whether any children below the age of 25 is part of the 
household or not. It doesn’t measure how many, only if any children are living by their parents. 
 Size of workplace is a scale variable measuring the number of people working at the workplace. As 
in the case of union density, this number is calculated from the total population including managers 
in order obtain a correct measure. 
5.4. FULL MODEL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
First the model was fitted to data covering all 1.657.127 cases representing the total labour market 
excluding managers, private entrepreneurs and employers. As can be seen from table 2, adding both 
years of education and union density at the workplace, increases the amount of variance accounted 
for significantly measured by the value of the adjusted R2. 
TABLE 2. FULL MODEL 
  _______MODEL 1_______ _______MODEL 2_______ ______MODEL 3________ ______MODEL 4________ 
  β  SE β  SE β  SE β  SE 
Constant 5.091*** .001 4.713*** .002 4.711*** .002 4.661*** .002 
Years of work experience .041*** .000 .038*** .000 .038*** .000 .038*** .000 
Years of work experience2 -.001*** .000 -.001*** .000 -.001*** .000 -.001*** .000 
Occupation 
        
Elementary occupations -.241*** .001 -.161*** .001 -.161*** .001 -.162*** .001 
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers -.184*** .001 -.111*** .001 -.112*** .001 -.120*** .001 
Craft and related trades workers -.217*** .001 -.180*** .001 -.180*** .001 -.183*** .001 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers -.238*** .003 -.190*** .003 -.189*** .003 -.179*** .003 
Service and sales workers -.212*** .001 -.154*** .001 -.154*** .001 -.149*** .001 
Clerical support workers -.155*** .001 -.119*** .001 -.119*** .001 -.118*** .001 
Technicians and associate professionals Reference  Reference  Reference  Reference  
Professionals .201*** .001 .148*** .001 .148*** .001 .149*** .001 
Managers .168*** .006 .164*** .006 .164*** .006 .168*** .006 
Woman -.151*** .000 -.145*** .000 -.146*** .000 -.145*** .000 
Public sector -.107*** .000 -.115*** .000 -.115*** .000 -.131*** .001 
Resident in the Copenhagen area .081*** .001 .076*** .001 .076*** .001 .080*** .001 
Resident children .012*** .000 .008*** .000 .008*** .000 .008*** .000 
Civil status -.005*** .001 -.002*** .001 -.002*** .001 -.002*** .001 
Size of company (1 unit = 100 employees) .002*** .000 .002*** .000 .002*** .000 .002*** .000 
Years of education after elementary school - - .029*** .000 .029*** .000 .029*** .000 
Union membership - - - - .004*** .001 -.011*** .001 
Workplace union density (1 unit = 10%) - - - - - - .010*** .000 
Adjusted R2 .394 .419 .419 .421 
Change in adjusted R2 - .024 .000 .002 
Note: * denotes significance at the p<0.05 level, ** at the p<0.01 level, and *** at the p<0.05 level. 
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6. RESULTS – ANALYSIS INCLUDING INDUSTRY LEVEL 
Table 3 presents the results with parameters and standard errors. The general result is that 
education and union density at the workplace has a positive effect on hourly earnings, whereas 
individual union membership has a negative effect. These results confirm the basic assumption, that 
the labour market institutions do influence the wage formation independently of the market. 
However, whereas the effect of education is positive and significant in all industries, the variation in 
union wage premiums is outspoken. These variations will be commented and discussed in detail 
below. The Fishing and Mining and quarrying industries will be excluded from this discussion because 
the parameters for most of the independent variables as well as the controls are insignificant. 
 Five groups of industries that follow similar patterns can be identified. First group is made up of 
the manufacturing industries with a premium from education a little below the national average, 
premium from union density a little above the national average and negative or insignificant 
parameter estimates with regard to individual union membership. If we recall the descriptive 
statistics, these industries share characteristics of mean hourly earnings below the general mean, 
TABLE 3. OLS ESTIMATES OF CENTRAL VARIABLES 
INDUSTRY _____ONE YEAR OF EDUCATION_____ _______10% UNION DENSITY______ ______UNION MEMBERSHIP_______ 
   Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
Agriculture, horticulture, forestry 0.037*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.001 0.110 0.007 
Fishing -0.012 0.011 -0.210 0.010 0.233** 0.067 
Mining and quarrying 0.018*** 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.026 0.016 
Mfr. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.017*** 0.001 0.018*** 0.001 -0.004 0.004 
Mfr. of textiles and leather 0.015*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.002 -0.022* 0.009 
Mfr. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.023*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.001 -0.024*** 0.004 
Mfr. of chemicals and plastic products 0.021*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.003 
Mfr. of other non-metallic mineral prod. 0.007*** 0.001 0.01*** 0.002 -0.005 0.007 
Mfr. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.027*** 0.000 0.011*** 0.001 -0.015*** 0.002 
Mfr. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.016*** 0.001 0.018*** 0.001 -0.011* 0.005 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.026*** 0.001 -0.011*** 0.002 -0.025** 0.007 
Construction 0.046*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.041*** 0.002 
Sale and rep. of motor vehicles, sale of fuel 0.052*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 -0.009* 0.004 
Wholesale except of motor vehicles 0.030*** 0.000 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.023*** 0.002 
Re. trade and repair work exc. of m. vehic. 0.036*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.021*** 0.002 
Hotels and restaurants 0.037*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.004 0.005 
Transport 0.012*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.003 
Post and telecommunications 0.013*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.033*** 0.003 
Finance and insurance 0.036*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.037*** 0.003 
Letting and sale of real estate 0.025*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.001 0.006 0.006 
Business activities 0.03*** 0.000 -0.008*** 0.000 -0.022*** 0.002 
Public administration 0.026*** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.029*** 0.002 
Education 0.024*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.002 
Human health activities 0.043*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.035*** 0.002 
Social institutions etc. 0.02*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.001 
Associations, culture and refuse disposal 0.023*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.001 0.035*** 0.003 
Entire labour market 0.029*** 0.000 0.010*** 0.000 -0.011*** 0.001 
Notes: * = significant at the p<0.05 level, ** = significant at the p<0.01 level, *** = significant at the p<0.001 level. Dependent variable are the the natural log of the hourly wage as estimated by Statistics Denmark. 
Controls in the model are work ecperience and its square, 8 occupation dummies, gender, sector, residency in the Copenhagen area, resident children, single and size of company. 
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around 12 years of education and fairly high union density. They are also all private sector 
industries. 
 The second group is made up of industries mainly located within the public sector: Public 
administration, Education, Human health activities and Social institutions. Premiums with regard to 
education are below national average except for Human health activities, which is among the industries 
with the highest education wage premium. Wage premiums from union density are very small, 
insignificant or negative. However, premiums from individual union membership are high. It 
appears that education does not pay of especially well and you benefit from your individual 
membership of the trade unions, not from the collective effort of heightening the union density. 
These industries are all characterized by very high levels of union density. 
 The third group share some contra intuitive estimates: in the cases of Electricity, gas and water supply, 
Wholesale except of motor vehicles, Retail trade and repair work except of motor vehicles, Post and 
telecommunication, Finance and insurance, Letting and sale of real estate and Business activities the estimates of 
both union density at the workplace and individual union membership are either negative or 
insignificant. These industries vary greatly with respect to the average wage level, level of education, 
union density and wage premium from education. 
 The fourth group consists of industries situated in the private sector, with positive parameter 
estimates with regard to both union density and individual union membership. These are 
Construction, Transport, and Associations, culture and refuse disposal. With respect to wage premium from 
education they vary from Construction with the highest parameter estimate of all to Transport with 
lowest estimate of all. They all four do however share the trait of a union density and educational 
level below average. 
 The final and fifth group consists of Agriculture, horticulture, forestry, Hotels and restaurants and Sale and 
rep. of motor vehicles, sale of fuel. The education wage-premium is above average and the wage premium 
from union density is positive whereas the estimates of individual membership are insignificant. 
Union density is low, the level of education is below average and the wages as well are low. 
6.1. DISCUSSION 
Considering groups one and two - manufacturing industries and industries mainly situated within 
the public sector -, it is striking that the patterns of union wage premiums are so different given that 
both groups have high levels of union density. A possible interpretation is that the effect on union 
bargaining power originating from increased union density at the workplace level already has 
reached its maximum in the public sector industries. We get an indication supporting that this 
might be the case from the fact that the standard deviation of union density by workplace in the 
second group is among the lowest ranging from 22.5% to 24.4%, whereas the first group ranges 
from 24.1% to 26.6%, which is higher, but still below the general level. The higher level of variation 
with respect to union density in the manufacturing industries indicates that there might be more 
variation with respect to union bargaining power, which in turn explains why union density has a 
positive effect on wages in this group as opposed to the public sector. 
 Still there is reason to believe that the effects are mediated by institutional effect depending on 
sector. One way to interpret the results from this perspective could be that in the private sector 
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wages are negotiated company by company, thus union density at the workplace are an important 
determinant of union bargaining power, hence strongly related to the pay level. In the public sector, 
on the other hand, collective agreements outlining the general frames with regard to pay level are 
made at a more central level. Hence, bargaining power is determined by the level of union density 
at the general level, not the workplace level. This would explain the absence of significant relation 
between union density at the workplace and hourly wages. 
 The explanation of the negative effect of union density and membership on wages in the third 
group might have to do with the occupational composition of the industries. If the union effects 
are positive among some occupation groups in the way that unions provide wages above the market 
level, which in turn are compensated for by other occupational groups who are paid below market 
level, these groups are negatively influenced by a higher level of union density at the workplace. If 
the negatively influenced groups are relatively large it could explain the estimate. 
 Another explanation is that occupational groups, which receive very high salaries and have no 
tradition for being members of unions such as consultants and stockjobbers, can cause the estimate 
to indicate a spurious negative relation between union membership and wages because these 
occupational groupings ‘escapes’ the occupational control variable, which only considers 
occupation distributed on nine categories. In other words we might be dealing with a selection 
problem at the variable or/and case level. 
 Finally, because of the solidarity internally among the trade unions, some groups may be paid 
below market level if they follow the regulations in the collective agreement because the unions 
seek to redistribute among the different occupational strata or classes due to normative motivation. 
If some members of these groups, which are negatively influenced by the wage regulation in the 
collective agreement, leave the union and individually manage to negotiate a wage closer to the 
market level, this could explain why union membership has a negative effect on wage. 
 These are, however, all speculations, and further research are necessary in order to determine the 
correct explanation of these puzzling results. 
 Group four consists of industries with average wage premiums from education and positive wage 
premiums from both union density and membership. They all have a high share of employees with 
little or no education beyond elementary school, who compete for the low-paid unskilled job. These 
groups of wage earners are often considered difficult to organize and it is difficult to negotiate 
wages above market level because the trade unions do not exercise a monopoly of labour supply 
due to the jobs’ unskilled character; no special skills or training are required as in the case of skilled 
jobs. If at the same time, strong trade unions are present, which organize skilled workers such as 
the different skilled trades of the construction industry, it explains the high wage premium from 
education. This premium is produced in part by the monopoly on the supply of labour to certain 
essential occupation which is maintained by the exclusion of workers who do not have the proper 
formal training of the trade. This logic explains the union wage premium from union density as well 
as the premium from individual membership, if membership works as an admission card to the well 
paid skilled jobs as well as supplementary education. 
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 However, it is very difficult to determine whether such a segmentation logic applies, because the 
three industries in the group are quite different, especially Associations, culture and refuse disposal seems 
rather complex. We might get a hint when we compare this group with group five, which has high 
wage premiums from education, small but positive from density and none from individual 
membership. The main difference from group four is a much lower union density, 55% on average 
as opposed to 72%. The difference might simply be that within these industries the unions are too 
weak to exercise much influence on wage formation and as a consequence, wages are regulated 
almost solely by the market which is indicated the high premiums from education. 
6.2 POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS ON INEQUALITY 
Before conclusion we shall consider some empirical indications of equalizing effects of the 
institutions. Table 4 summarizes the conclusions discussed above with regard to the five groups of 
industries and adds some new numbers. Column Education indicates whether the models’ estimated 
positive effect on hourly wage is below, on average or above the national mean. Density indicates 
whether the wage premium from union density is estimated to be negative, positive or insignificant 
and the same is the case with membership.  General union density is the mean of the union density at 
the workplaces. Finally, Relative pay-rate variation is the standard deviation of the hourly wage’s share 
of the mean hourly wage. This measure is taken to indicate the level of inequality among wage 
earners in the industry as a high percentage indicates generally high differences in income among 
the employees and a low percentage indicates generally small differences or wage compression. In 
the following we shall consider the association between pay-rate variation as an indicator of 
inequality and the different factors influencing wage formation analysed above. 
 Table 54 displays the correlation coefficient of the different measures and the relative pay-rate 
variation for the 26 industries minus Fishing and Mining and quarrying. The bivariate correlation 
coefficients show that high premiums from education are associated with greater relative pay-rate 
variation and on the other hand that high union wage premiums are associated with a lower level of 
relative pay-rate variation. When we take the partial correlation between education and relative pay-
rate variation, controlling for the effects of density at the workplace, individual membership and the 
general level of density, the correlation is even higher and still significant. The negative correlations 
of union density/individual membership and pay-rate variation are quite steady and still significant 
                                                          
4 Please note that the p < 0.10 is chosen as the level of significance because of the very small number of cases, 24 industries. 
TABLE 4. GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
 SEGMENT 
______________OLS ESTIMATES' EFFECT ON HOURLY WAGE_____________ __REL. PAY-RATE VARIATION_ __GENERAL UNION DENSITY_ 
Education Density Membership % % 
Group 1 Below Positive Neagtive 31 % 77 % 
Group 2 Average None Positive 29 % 85 % 
Group 3 Average Negative Negative 38 % 68 % 
Group 4 Average Positive Positive 34 % 72 % 
Group 5 Above Positive none 34 % 55 % 
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when controlling for the effect of education and respectively union density at the workplace and 
union membership effects. 
 These results should be treated carefully because a lot of other unobserved factors might 
influence the level of the relative pay-rat variation which could prove the relations implied by the 
correlation coefficient to be spurious. Nonetheless, the pattern of the results are quite rigorously 
suggesting that the effect of unions and labour market institutions on the wage formation is an 
egalitarian one in the sense that, inequality measured as wage distribution is higher when union 
presence are low and human capital effects are high and vice versa. These findings, if they still stand 
after further testing, support the expectation that labour market institutions regulate and 
contextualize the market effect in an equalizing way by redistributing income between groups of 
wage earners. They also support that institutional effects and human capital effects interact in a 
way, which means that unions reduce the human capital effect. To be clear, these suggestions with 
regard to the egalitarian effect of trade unions in relation to human capital factors should for now 
only be regarded as pointing to issues and possible thesis, which should be the object of further 
research. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The identification of five groups of industries with distinctive patterns with regard to the wage 
premiums from education and trade union membership confirms that institutions matter when we 
seek to explain wage formation. The degree of centralization of bargaining seems to be an 
important variable, as was discussed in the case of group one and two situated private and public 
sector. Also, the level of union density at the single workplace was found to be associated with a 
positive effect on union wage-premium. However, if the general union density within the industry is 
very low, it seems that the estimated effect of union density at the workplace level shrinks. 
 Within some industries the union wage-premium was negative on both the account of the 
collective and individual effects. These results are puzzling and should spur further investigation. 
They may be the result of the unions actually negotiating agreements that dictates wages which are 
below the market level or they may be the result of methodological flaws. 
 The analysis of the correlation of the central variables and the relative pay-rate variation indicates 
that the stronger the trade union effect on wage formation the smaller the effect of human capital 
TABLE 5. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE RELATIVE PAY-RATE VARIATION 
  ____1. EDUCATION EFFECT____ _____2. DENSITY EFFECT______ ___3. MEMBERSHIP EFFECT___ _____4. GENERAL DENSITY____ 
  
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Bivariate 0.458** 0.012 -0.366** 0.039 -0.325* 0.060 -0.411** 0.023 
Partial 0.502*** 0.009 -0.390** 0.033 -0.372** 0.040 -0.289* 0.090 
Controls 2. & 3. 1. 1. 1. 
Partial 0.404** 0.035 -0.426** 0.024 -0.330* 0.067 -0.341* 0.060 
Controls 2., 3. & 4. 1. & 4. 1. & 2. 1. & 2. 
Notes: * significant at the p < 0.10 level, ** significant at the p < 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level. One-tailed significance test. 
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factors and the smaller the inequality. If these results are correct, they confirm that trade unions 
have and egalitarian effect, which in part mutes the market effect on wage formation. However, 
these connections should be the object of further testing. 
 The results taken together indicate a possible case of institutional determined labour market 
segmentation. On the one hand we have companies and industries with weak unions without 
influence on wage formation, which as a consequence mainly is determined by human capital 
distribution resulting in a more unequal wage distribution. On the other hand we have companies 
and sectors with strong unions who tend to weaken the effect of the market and human capital 
factors resulting in a less unequal wage distribution.  
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APPENDIX 
DATA LOSS 
Only 1,657,172 individual cases of the total 3.6 million individuals engaged in active employment at 
some time during 2007 are included in the analysis. In the following, an account of the data loss is 
given. 
TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF DATA LOSS 
CATEGORY OF LOSS  LOSS  REMAINING CASES 
Engaged in active employment 2007 0 3,595,634 
Not aged 16-65 280,801 3,314,833 
Private entrepreneurs, managers, assisting spuose, 
employer, chief executive, employee on leave 
799,599 2,515,234 
Reliability of estimated hourly earning 423,395 2,091,839 
Military 14,682 2,077,157 
Missing information 414,242 1,662,915 
Occupation  290,080 1,787,077 
Industry 2,588 2,074,569 
Education 29,234 2,047,923 
Wages 8 2,077,149 
Sector 116,420 1,960,737 
Work experience 4 2,077,153 
Outliers  (Top and bottom pro mille. DKK 25 > hourly 
wage > DKK 878) 
3,351 1,659,564 
Pilots and air traffic controllers 5,743 1,657,172 
280,801 are excluded because they are not aging between 16 and 65 (16 is the age leaving ground 
school and 65 is the retirement age in Denmark).  A group of 799,599 top managers, employers, 
private entrepreneurs and people whose main income did not come from wage earning have been 
excluded. They may be attributed a wage earning but the way their wages may be influenced by 
institutional regulation is indirect and incomparable to ordinary wage earners whose wages we have 
reason to believe are directly influenceded by collective agreements. In addition 14,628 were 
excluded because they are in the military which make them incomparable with employees in other 
industries. These are all reasonable exclusions which basically can be justified with reference to the 
definition of population, all wage earners who are subject to standard institutionalized regulation of 
the Danish labour market. More troublesome is the exclusion of 423,395 due to the estimation of 
their hourly earnings being unreliable according to Statistics Denmark. These are mostly individuals 
who on a weekly basis have worked less than 20 hours on a yearly average. Due to the way the 
hourly earnings are estimated the reliability of the estimate regarding employees on part time is of a 
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too poor quality to be trusted. We will get back to this when we consider the dependent variable, 
hourly earnings. In addition 414,242 cases are excluded because we do not have information 
regarding one or more of the variables which are to be used the analysis. The main sources are 
missing information with regard to the occupation of the individuals and whether to classify their 
workplace within the public or private sector. Finally, 3,351 outlier cases have been excluded 
because their hourly wages were either unrealistically low or high. The occupational groups of pilots 
and flight controllers were also excluded because they appeared as having received unrealistically 
little education compared to their ranking at the second highest qualification level of the ISCO 
classification (See also Albæk & Thomsen 2011:28). 
TABLE 7. TOTAL POPULATION AND SAMPLE COMPARISON 
CATEGORY 
_______POPULATION IN TOTAL_______ _________CASES IN MODELS_________ 
n Pct. n Pct. 
Wage-earners in total 2,663,058 100.0 % 1,657,172 100.0 % 
Private sector 1,635,767 61.4 % 990,768 59.8 % 
Public sector 848,481 31.9 % 666,404 40.2 % 
Sector unknown 178,810 6.7 % 0 0.0 %  
Member of trade union 1,810,170 68.0 % 1,339,643 80.8 % 
Part-time employees 408,771 15.3 % 36,988 2.2 % 
The consequences of the data loss with regard to the level of union density, the relative 
representation of the private and public sector and full vs. part time employees are summarized in 
table 7. The data loss has resulted in an overrepresentation of the public sector and an 
underrepresentation of part-time employees. These are connected because 75.5 % percent of all 
part-time employees are employed in the private sector which is 16.8 % of the employees in the 
private sector compared to only 10.5 % in the public sector. It follows, that a random loss of part-
time employees will change the balance between the sectors in favor of the public one. Another 
source of data loss is that small companies in the private sector are excused from reporting detailed 
information regarding their employees to Statistics Denmark. Thus, the data loss caused by missing 
data will be dominated employees from the private sector, thus adding to underrepresentation of 
private sector employees. 
 Also union density is higher among the cases under study. This can in general be accounted for by 
the relative loss of data from the private sector where union density is lower. Thus, when the public 
sector is overrepresented, union density will rise. However, as we only consider means and not 
marginal differences the results should still hold true as indications of the general relation between 
education and union membership on one side and hourly wages on the other, with the exception of 
part-time employment. 
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